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 The Lone Wolf – Solo Terrorism and the Challenge of 
Preventative Prosecution 
Kendall Coffey 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On September 11, 2001, as we will never forget, al-Qaeda’s elab-
orate planning and deployment of numerous terrorist agents resulted 
in shocking destruction and 2,976 deaths.  Since the time of those 
shattering atrocities, though, threats within our borders have centered 
increasingly not on concerted activities but on solo actors of terror-
ism.1  This emerging threat – often described as “Lone Wolf Terror-
ism”2 – has seen efforts that were tragically successful including the 
2009 shooting rampage that left thirteen dead at Fort Hood.  Others 
have come frighteningly close to carnage, such as the 2010 attempt to 
detonate explosives in Times Square.  Reports indicate that in recent 
years most Islamic terrorist plots in the United States do not employ 
multiple agents in concert and instead are perpetrated by a “Lone 
Wolf.”3  Recognizing this growing danger, President Barack Obama 
observed that single actor terrorism was “the most likely scenario that 
we have to guard against right now.”4  When an individual acts alone – 
and does not communicate destructive intentions to others – that per-
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Patrick Jonsson, How Undercover Agents Nabbed ‘Lone Wolf’ U.S. Capitol Ter-
rorist, THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Feb. 23, 2012), 
http://www.alaskadispatch.com/article/how-undercover-agents-nabbed-lone-wolf-us-capitol-
terrorist?page=-full. 
 2 Raffaello Pantucci, A Typology of Lone Wolves: Preliminary Analysis of Lone Islamist 
Terrorists, THE INT’L CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF RADICALISATION & POLITICAL VIOLENCE 
(Apr. 2011), http://icsr.info/publications/papers/1302002992ICSRPaper_ATypologyofLoneWolves_ 
Pantucci.pdf.  In the analysis published by the International Centre for the Study of Radicaliza-
tion and Political Violence, the term “Lone Wolf terrorist” refers to “individual pursuing Islamic 
terrorist goals alone, either driven by personal reasons or their belief they are not of any ideo-
logical group…” Id. at 9. 
 3 Jonsson, supra note 1. 
 4 Officials Worry About Solitary Terrorists, UPI (Aug. 18, 2011), 
http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2011/08/18/Officials-worry-about-solitary-terrorists/UPI-2225 
1313648694/; see also Jason Ryan, Texas Student Khalid Aldawsari Arrested on Terror Charges; 
Target George W. Bush, ABC NEWS (Feb. 24, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/texan- 
charged-plans-bomb-bush-home-dams-nuclear/story?id=12990927#.UC6Ex46Pf3Q (“. . . the arrest 
of Aldawasari is alarming to counterterrorism officials because he was largely undetected . . .”). 
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son is far more likely than a collaborative to remain invisible until the 
moment of attack.  Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano 
underscored the difficulty of prior detection in these circumstances: 
“[B]y their very definition, they’re not conspiring with others, they 
may not be communicating with others, there’s very little to indicate 
that something is under way.”5  Emphasizing the stealth strategies 
available to lethal soloists, Andres Breivik, who used guns and bombs 
to kill seventy-seven people in Oslo, Norway, wrote shortly before his 
attacks in July 2011: “Solo Martyr Cells are completely unknown to 
our enemies and have a minimal chance of being exposed.”6 
II. THE “LONE WOLF” THREAT 
Because terrorism is usually driven by beliefs that are shared with 
others, it may seem anomalous that one would act apart from that 
network and without active accomplices.7  Yet several reasons seem to 
account for rising perils from solitary perpetrators of terrorism.8  First, 
since September 11th, United States military forces abroad and law 
enforcement at home have relentlessly pursued a highly effective 
campaign against Jihadist groups.9  Osama Bin Laden was one of 
many in al-Qaeda who were eliminated through arrest or military ac-
tion, leaving the organization reeling and perhaps incapable of return-
                                                                                                                           
 5 Paul Cruickshank & Tim Lister, The Lone Wolf-the Unknowable Face of Terror, CNN 
OPINION (Feb. 18, 2012), http://articles.cnn.com/2012-02-18/opinion/opinion_lone-wolf-
terror_1_lone-wolf-terror-attack-lone-terrorists?_s=PM:OPINION. 
 6 Id. at 4. 
 7 In the Code of Federal Regulations, terrorism is defined as “the unlawful use of force 
and violence against person or property to intimidate or coerce a government population or any 
segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.”  28 C.F.R. § 0.85(l) 2010. 
 8 The ICSRPV classifies lone wolves into four distinct groups.  See generally Pantucci, 
supra note 2, at 14-30.  The “loner” is an individual actor who, without the any external com-
mand or control, plans or carries out an act of terrorism by him or herself.  Id. at 14.  Similar to 
the “loner,” the “lone wolf” operates in the real world alone, but has some form of contact with 
members of a terrorist organization on the Internet.  Id. at 19-20.  The “lone wolf pack,” as one 
can imagine, consists of a group of lone wolves operating outside any formal structure or com-
mand.  Id. at 24-25.  Finally, the “lone attacker” will carry out an act of terrorism alone, but will 
do so under the direct order of a terrorist organization like al Qaeda.  Id. at 29-30.  Distinct from 
the “lone wolf” or “lone wolf pack,” the “lone attacker” has actual connections and regular 
contact with organizations.  Id. 
 9 Hearing before the Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence U.S. House of Representa-
tives, 112th Cong. 2 (2011) (statement of Matthew G. Olsen), available at 
http://www.nctc.gov/press_ room/speeches/dnctc_testimony_before_hpsci_111006.pdf [hereinaf-
ter Olsen] (“Counterterrorism successes and sustained pressure have left al-Qaeda at its weakest 
point in the last ten years, and significantly degraded the group's ability to conduct attacks out-
side of South Asia.  This is exemplified by the lack of a successful operation in the West since 
the 2005 transportation bombings in London.  Further, the killing of Usama bin Ladin [sic] in 
May and last month’s killing of al-Qaeda’s newest deputy, Atiyah abd al Rahman, mark strategic 
milestones in our fight against al-Qaeda and are likely to accelerate al-Qaeda‘s decline.”). 
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ing to its former capacity for organized destruction.10  Meanwhile, 
within the United States, prosecutors and investigators have had great 
success against domestic terror cells.11  Utilizing the prosecutor-
friendly laws of conspiracy as well as aggressive undercover and sur-
veillance operations,12 they have targeted groups across the country 
with striking success.  Additionally, apparently recognizing the seri-
ous, perhaps irreversible, destruction to its leadership and infrastruc-
ture, al-Qaeda itself has encouraged solo terrorists to act.  Its Yemen 
branch even published a magazine article in English, inciting attacks 
by lone operatives and providing a recipe, “How to Make a Bomb in 
Your Mom’s Kitchen.”13  Al-Qaeda also released a video soliciting 
unilateral violence titled, “You Are Only Responsible for Yourself.”14 
Along with growing recognition – by United States authorities as 
well as terrorists – that a single perpetrator is less detectible, is the 
reality that deadly results can be achieved without accomplices.  To-
day, perhaps more than ever before, a collective’s destructive belief 
can be advanced without collective action.  In the Internet age, nei-
ther group training nor group reinforcement is required for an actor’s 
lethal agenda.  The websites, social media, and online chat rooms give 
a potential terrorist access to information about everything from guns 
and explosives to government facilities,15 while also creating instant 
                                                                                                                           
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Federal prosecutors have convicted more than 90% of terrorism-charged defendants on 
at least one count of terrorism according to a study conducted by Human Rights First.  The 
study examined 257 cases of terrorism from 9/11 through the end of 2007.  Fact Sheet: Prosecut-
ing and Detaining Terror Suspects in the U.S. Criminal Justice System, 09 Op. Att’y Gen. 564 
(June 9. 2009), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/June/09-ag-564.html (citing In Pursuit of 
Justice: Prosecuting Terrorism Cases in the Federal Court, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST).  “Since the 
1990s, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York (S.D.N.Y) has investi-
gated and successfully prosecuted a wide range of international and domestic terrorism cases — 
including the bombings of the World Trade Center and U.S. Embassies in East Africa in the 
1990s.  More recent cases include those against individuals who provided material support to al-
Qaeda and other terrorist groups, as well as against international arms trafficker Monzer al 
Kassar and the Somalian pirate charged in the hijacking of the Maersk Alabama.”  Id.  Not only 
have federal prosecutors had great success securing convictions, but the United States has also 
frozen over $139 million funds and assets and has seized more than $60 million in funds and 
assets, all aimed at aiding terrorism.  Department of the Treasury, Budget of The United States 
Government, U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE (Feb. 2, 2004), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
pkg/BUDGET-2005-BUD/pdf/BUDGET-2005-BUD-25.pdf; see also Winning The War on 
Terror, Budget of The United States Government, U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE (Feb. 
2, 2004), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BUDGET-2005-BUD/pdf/BUDGET-2005-BUD-7.pdf. 
 13 Paul Cruickshank & Tim Lister, The ‘Lone Wolf’ – The Unknowable Face of Terror, 
CNN (Feb. 18, 2012), http://edition.cnn.com/2012/02/18/opinion/lone-wolf-terror/index.html. 
 14 Id.  
 15 Olsen, supra note 9, at 6 (“Al-Qaeda core and some of its regional affiliates have re-
peatedly encouraged independent attacks, which could further encourage violent acts. Increas-
ingly sophisticated English-language propaganda, including Inspire magazine, that provides 
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messages of hate to intensify the motivation for terrorism.  There is no 
need for a would-be Jihadist to attend meetings with other radicals 
where an FBI informant might be present.  With all of the information 
that can be obtained on websites and Internet articles, a potential ter-
rorist has much less need than before to seek others for training in 
classes that could be more easily subject to surveillance by law en-
forcement.  As FBI Director Robert S. Mueller observed, “[W]e have 
seen a rise in websites that promote jihad and give step-by-step in-
structions on how to build suicide vests and explosives.”16 
Today, would-be Jihadists can, in effect, conduct their own home 
schooling on creating destructive devices and selecting targets of ter-
rorist opportunity.  Moreover, through the Internet, a loner cannot 
only become better informed but dangerously energized through on-
going reinforcement of prejudices and paranoias.17  As President 
Obama explained in an interview, “When you’ve got one person who 
is deranged or driven by a hateful ideology, they can do a lot of dam-
age and it’s a lot harder to track down those lone wolf operators.”18 
Recent lone wolf scenarios have seen varying stages of opera-
tional progress at the time of detection.  In some instances, terrorist 
operations were actually initiated before the menace became known.  
In the worst of the solo attacks, United States Army Major Nidal Has-
san shot 13 people to death at Fort Hood, Texas, in a November 2009 
rampage that also wounded almost twenty-four more victims.19  In 
                                                                                                                           
extremists with guidance to carry out homeland attacks remains easily available via the Internet. 
English-language web forums also foster a sense of community and further indoctrinate new 
recruits, both of which can lead to increased levels of violent activity.”); see also Susan B. Glass-
er & Steve Coll, The Web as Weapon, WASH. POST (Aug. 9, 2005), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/08/AR2005080801018_3.html 
(describing how the Internet and online forums are used to disseminate ideological rhetoric and 
to provide instructions on how to, among many things, make and use explosives); Gabriel Wei-
mann, Terrorists and Their Tools – Part II, YALE GLOBAL ONLINE (Apr. 26, 2004), 
http://yaleglobal.ya le.edu/content/terrorists-and-their-tools-–-part-ii (“They can learn from the 
Internet about the schedules and locations of targets such as transportation facilities, nuclear 
power plants, public buildings, airports and ports, and even counterterrorism measures.”). 
 16 Robert S. Mueller, III, Dir. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Remarks at the Executive 
Club of Chicago (Sept. 12, 2006), available at http://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/fighting-
terrorism-yesterday-today-and-tomorrow/. 
 17 Reinforcement and encouragement can push some would-be terrorists across the line 
from aspirational to operational.  “Cromitie was unlikely to commit an act without the support 
of the FBI source . . . .”  United States v. Cromitie, 781 F. Supp. 2d 211, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 18 Obama: ‘Lone Wolf’ Terror Attack Biggest Concern, YAHOO NEWS (Aug. 16, 2011), 
http://news.yahoo.com/obama-lone-wolf-terror-attack-biggest-concern-223347040.html [herein-
after Obama: ‘Lone Wolf’ Terror]. 
 19 Army Charges Fort Hood Shooting Suspect With 32 Counts of Attempted Murder,  
FOXNEWS.COM (Dec. 3, 2009), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2009/12/02/army-charges-fort-hood-
shooting-suspect-counts-of-attempted-murder/ [hereinafter Army Charges Fort Hood Shooting 
Suspect]; see also Gunman Kills 12, Wounds 31 at Fort Hood, MSNBC.COM, 
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addition to cases of tragic results, there have been terrorist attacks 
that were actually launched but failed to succeed due to malfunction-
ing materials or other operational failures.  Thus, a single terrorist was 
able to plant explosives in New York’s Times Square20 while the so-
called “Underwear Bomber” succeeded in boarding a commercial 
aircraft and partially ignited explosives.21 Tragedies were averted be-
cause of failed detonations rather than prior detection. 
Fortunately, with the overwhelming majority of lone wolf efforts, 
law enforcement has intercepted would-be killers before their plans 
advanced to a point of extreme danger.  At times aided by citizen dili-
gence, early awareness has led to intensive surveillance and covert 
interaction with the suspect until the time of arrest and indictment.  In 
some instances, investigations have been initiated based on concrete 
evidence of terrorist activity.22  With others, most of the ingredients of 
criminality were largely furnished by undercover law enforcement 
agents who enticed suspects to participate in criminal acts that may 
not have otherwise materialized.23 
This article examines the lone wolf terrorist and the legal strate-
gies that are deployed to combat this accelerating threat of terrorism.  
With respect to schemes that progressed to actual operations, im-
portant questions arise as to whether more could have been done to 
avert disaster.  As to terrorist activities that were uncovered in early 
stages, valuable lessons may be derived as to how such success was 
achieved.  In some instances, questions will continue to be debated as 
to whether the target was a would-be terrorist or a wannabe loose 
talker who was criminalized through law enforcement enticement. 
These issues and more will be engaged in paragraphs that follow. 
III. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 
Plotting and executing a terrorist attack without commands from 
an organization represents a deadly tradition.  In the nineteenth cen-
tury, Mihkail Bakunin, the infamous Russian anarchist, described the 
                                                                                                                           
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/33678801/ns/us_newscrime_and_courts/t/gunman-kills-w#.T4TVRW 
_G6V8 (last updated Nov. 5, 2009) [hereinafter Gunman].  
 20 Indictment, United States v. Shahzad, No. 10-cr-00541, 2010 WL 2464622 (S.D.N.Y., 
2010). 
 21 Indictment, United States v. Abdulmutallab, No. 2:10-cr-20005, 2010 WL 22849 (E.D. 
Mich. Jan. 6, 2010). 
 22 See generally Complaint, United States v. Aldawsari, No. 11-MJ-017, 2011 WL 668355 
(N.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 2011) [hereinafter Complaint Aldawsari]. 
 23 United States v. Cromitie, 781 F. Supp. 2d 211 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Complaint, United 
States v. Khalifi, No. 1:12-MJ-87, 2012 WL 517540 (E.D. Va. Feb. 17, 2012). 
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concept of “propaganda by deed”24 and advocated that solitary assas-
sins should kill individuals who represented the corrupt social struc-
ture.25  Among other things, acting individually allowed anarchists to 
avoid being bogged down by the coercive power usually associated 
with large, hierarchal organizations.26  Although in the early 1900’s 
lone wolf terrorism fell out of favor with many anarchists,27 terrorism 
by single perpetrators accelerated later in the century.  Lone wolves 
killed 7% of United States terrorism victims during 1955-1978, a rate 
that increased to 26% from 1978-1999.28  White supremacy, Islamist 
fundamentalism, anti-abortion, and nationalism/separatism have been 
the most prevalent ideological agendas for lone wolves in recent 
years.29 But the best known cases actually reflect a wider range of mo-
tivations. 
Leon Czolgosz, an anarchist and one of the earliest known lone 
wolves in American history, shot and killed President William McKin-
ley after hearing a speech by a prominent figure in the anarchist 
movement.30  On September 6, 1901, Czolgosz waited in line for his 
turn, greeted the President at a reception, and then shot him twice in 
the abdomen.  McKinley died a week later.31 
From 1940 to 1956, George Metesky, enraged at his employer’s 
denial of his disability claim after suffering a debilitating injury on the 
job, planted approximately thirty bombs in New York City.32  He usu-
ally targeted public places, fixing explosives to the outside of a utilities 
building and to the bottom of seats in movie theaters.33  Metesky’s acts 
of terrorism never killed anyone but did injure seven people.34  
Millions will continue to debate whether the assassinations of 
President John F. Kennedy in 1963 and of Dr. Martin Luther King in 
1968 were single perpetrator crimes or terrorism orchestrated by con-
                                                                                                                           
 24 Lone-Wolf Terrorism, INSTITUT VOOR VELLIGHEIDS-EN CRISISMANAGEMENT, 12 
(June 6, 2012), http://www.transnationalterrorism.eu/tekst/publications/Lone-
Wolf%20Terrorism.pdf [hereinafter Lone-Wolf Terrorism]. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. at 14.  It should be noted that these figures assume that a lone wolf is either an unaf-
filiated individual who commits an act of terrorism, but can also include a group of up to 3 indi-
viduals unconnected with some other group that commit an act of terrorism.  See id.  Thirty 
unaffiliated individual terrorist cells were identified from 1968-2007 in the United States, ac-
counting for almost 42% of all identified cases of unaffiliated terrorism in the world.  Id. 
 29 Lone-Wolf Terrorism, supra note 24, at 20. 
 30 Leon Czolgosz, SPARTACUS EDUCATIONAL, http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/ 
USAczolgosz.htm (last visited April 11, 2012). 
 31 Id. 
 32 Lone-Wolf Terrorism, supra note 24, at 98. 
 33 Id.  
 34 Id. 
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spiracies.  Most agree, though, that Sirhan Sirhan acted alone when he 
assassinated Senator Robert F. Kennedy on May 6, 1968, in Los An-
geles, California.35  Born a Palestinian, Sirhan’s diary revealed that he 
attacked Senator Kennedy because of his support for Israel and his 
pledge to send bombers to that country.36  
Ten years later, Ted Kaczynski, known as the “Unabomber,” be-
gan a deadly bombing campaign.  Starting in 1978, he placed or 
mailed sixteen bombs until his eventual arrest in 1996.37  He had left a 
tenure-track position as a mathematician at the University of Califor-
nia to begin living a solitary life in a remote mountain cabin.  Identify-
ing himself as an anarchist,38 Kaczynski believed that a technological 
society is ultimately incompatible with individual freedom and must 
therefore be destroyed in order to free humanity.39  His attacks 
wounded twenty-three and killed three.40  Kaczynski is spending the 
rest of his life in a maximum security federal prison. 
IV. LONE WOLF ATTACKS SINCE 9/11 
A. Undetected Operations 
The wide array of beliefs and ideologies that motivated soloist 
terror in the past added to the challenges of developing meaningful 
profiles and predicting future perpetrators.  In the last few decades, 
though, a Jihadist agenda is emerging increasingly as a common de-
nominator.  The worst mass murder since September 11, 2001 that has 
been linked to a Jihadist agenda was the Fort Hood murder spree al-
legedly perpetrated by Major Nidal Hassan, a United States army 
psychiatrist.  Using firearms, he went on a rampage in November 
2009, killing thirteen people and attempting to kill many more before 
he was shot and paralyzed.41  Much of the motivation for Hassan’s 
murderous binge remains unclear.  And yet his proclamation that day 
as he stood on a desk declaring, “Allhu Akbar,” the Arabic phrase 
                                                                                                                           
 35 Id. at 98-99. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. at 99-100. 
 38 HEATHER GAUTNEY, PROTEST AND ORGANIZATION IN THE ALTERNATIVE 
GLOBALIZATION ERA: NGOS, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, AND POLITICAL PARTIES 199 (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2009). 
 39 Paul Cooijmans, Comment on the Unabomber's Manifesto, http://www.paulcooijmans. 
com/psychology/unabomber.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2012) (“The Unabomber's central and 
fatal conclusion can be summed up as: Technological society is incompatible with individual 
freedom and must therefore be destroyed and replaced by primitive society so that people will 
be free again.”). 
 40 Lone-Wolf Terrorism, supra note 24, at 99. 
 41 Army Charges Fort Hood Shooting Suspect, supra note 19.  
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for “God is Great,” coincides with other evidence indicating a violent 
reaction towards perceived American aggression against Muslims.42  
Hassan used guns, the simplest tools for terrorists, rather than explo-
sives.  In contrast to homemade explosives, where the acquisition of 
key ingredients may create clues, terrorist symptoms are much less 
apparent with firearms and less likely to prompt intervention.  In a 
society where the possession of handguns is now an individual consti-
tutional right,43 it is problematic and likely unrealistic to prevent ac-
cess to guns except for those who have already been convicted of a 
felony or adjudicated mentally ill.  
Hassan had no prior criminal history to suggest that a military of-
ficer and trained medical doctor could erupt in such heinous fury.44  
News reports indicate that Hassan was “pretty upset” about his pend-
ing deployment to Iraq, and he had recently received poor perfor-
mance reviews.45  By themselves, though, these circumstances do not 
comprise a catalyst for a killing spree.  More intriguing are reports 
about e-mail exchanges, radical statements, and Internet postings that, 
if substantiated, would have signaled a dangerous mindset.46   
While the trial of Hassan may shed further light about the pre-
ventability of his crimes, when Abdul Haqim Mujahid Muhammad 
killed one victim and wounded another at an army recruiting office in 
Memphis, Tennessee, prior concerns were apparent, but no action had 
been taken.47  Once a normal teenager from a solid family upbringing, 
Muhammad had rejected his own culture and had adopted Islam by 
                                                                                                                           
 42 Id. 
 43 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008); Gunman, supra note 19. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Some reports linked Hasan to radical cleric Anwar al-Awlaki.  See Neal Conan and 
Dina Temple-Raston, FBI Tracks Possible Military Insider Threats, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO 
(June 27, 2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/06/27/155849671/fbi-tracks-possible-military-insider-
threats.  According to NPR, there were in all “16 emails between Anwar al-Awlaki and Nidal 
Hasan, and that's a lot of emails.  And they - the Department of Defense and the FBI didn't 
share information on that.”  Id.  According to a Fox News report, “The information about Ha-
san’s contact with al-Awlaki, who was killed Sept 30, 2011, in a CIA-led operation in Yemen, 
was reportedly not shared by the JTTF in Washington, D.C., with army investigators . . . . Fox 
News confirmed that Hasan openly saw suicide bombings as justified and cited the writings of 
Usama bin Laden on at least three occasions.”  Catherine Herridge, Exclusive: Outside Review 
of Massacre at Fort Hood To Be Filed Soon, Calling For Change at FBI, FOXNEWS.COM (July 6, 
2012), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2012/07/05/exclusive-independent-fort-hood-calls-for-
change-at-fbi/#ixzz21544SiRe.  If there was a single point of failure, Hasan's email contact with a 
known terrorist was never connected to his radical statements as an Army officer and psychia-
trist.  Id. 
 47 James Dao,  A Muslim Son, a Murder Trial and Many Questions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 
2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/17/us/17convert.html; Robert A. Martin, 
Affidavit of Search & Seizure Warrant (No. 8766) (Dist. Ct. Little Rock Ark., 2009), available at 
http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/988.pdf. 
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the time of his early twenties.48  Afterwards, he traveled to Yemen to 
learn Arabic and married a Yemini woman.  When Yemeni officials 
found fake Somali papers on Muhammad, they arrested him, con-
cerned that Somali was a training ground for Islamic extremists.49  Fol-
lowing that arrest, Muhammad was interviewed by the FBI.  Through 
his family’s efforts, the United States Department of State intervened 
to seek his release.50  Ultimately, Muhammad’s trial in Yemen was 
avoided as a result of the United States government’s entreaties, and 
he was deported and returned to the United States, but his alienation 
intensified and his radicalization deepened.51  
Following the murderous shootings, Muhammad pled guilty and 
received a life sentence.52  His father, Melvin Bledsoe, was grief-
stricken, not only for his son but also for the victims.  In March 2011, 
Bledsoe submitted a statement to the Committee on Homeland Secu-
rity decrying the lack of awareness about the radicalization of young 
people and the failure to take preventative measures in his son’s 
case.53  In those comments, he pointed out that, although the FBI was 
alarmed by the beliefs disclosed during Muhammad’s October 2008, 
interview, that information was not shared with his family.54  Nor did 
the family have an opportunity to share its deepening concerns about 
Muhammad’s radicalization with federal agents.  As a result, accord-
ing to Bledsoe, the indoctrination of his son progressed to a point 
where al-Qaeda members “convinced him to get revenge on Ameri-
ca.”55  Bledsoe blamed the “wrong caused by political correctness”56 
and emphasized that more action needed to be taken with respect to 
Islamic extremism.57  Expressing the hope that other children would 
not be similarly manipulated, Bledsoe said, “We must stop these ex-
tremist invaders from raping the minds of American citizens on 
American soil.”58 
It was not prior detection but an operational failure that saved 
lives when Faisal Shahzad attempted to detonate explosives inside a 
                                                                                                                           
 48 Dao, supra note 47. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
 53 The Extent of Radicalization in the American Muslim Community and that Communi-
ty’s Response: Hearing Before the Comm. Of Homeland Sec. 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of 
Melvin Bledsoe, private citizen), available at 
http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/Testimony%20Bledsoe.pdf. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
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rental car in the middle of New York’s Times Square.  As a natural-
ized United States citizen, Shahzad returned to the United States in 
February 2010, after spending five months in Pakistan.59  On May 1, 
2011, inside a rented Nissan Pathfinder, he placed multiple tanks filled 
with propane gas, gasoline canisters, fertilizer, fireworks, clocks, wir-
ing, and other components to create homemade explosives.60  His ef-
forts to activate the explosives failed, though, and when smoke was 
seen emanating from the car, vigilant police officers evacuated the 
area and called in the N.Y.P.D. bomb squad.  Law enforcement ef-
forts immediately commenced what led to Shahzad’s arrest two days 
later as he attempted to leave the United States on a commercial 
flight to Dubai.61  When captured, Shahzad was utterly unrepentant.  
Stating that he had received training in explosives in Pakistan, he fully 
acknowledged his efforts to explode the bomb and commit mass mur-
der.  Shahzad will spend the rest of his life in a maximum security fed-
eral prison.62  
Also horrifically close to inflicting carnage was Umar Farouk 
Abdulmutallab.  On Christmas Day 2009, the twenty-three year old 
Nigerian attempted to explode a suicide bomb on a transatlantic flight 
from Amsterdam to Detroit with 290 people on board.63  While the 
explosive materials imbedded in his underwear did not detonate,64 the 
resulting fire burned portions of Abdulmutallab’s body.  The terrify-
ing proximity to disaster sparked a controversy over whether Ab-
dulmutallab should have been permitted to board that flight.65  Ab-
dulmutallab’s father, a Nigerian public official, had notified United 
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States’ authorities that he believed his son had become dangerously 
committed to Islamic radicalism.66  Although Abdulmutallab was 
placed upon a watch list, he was not designated for a no-fly status.  As 
a result, he was able to skirt the watch list by boarding the Delta Air-
lines flight in Amsterdam and come within moments of exploding a 
suicide bomb that would have caused hundreds of deaths.  Tragedy 
was averted but only because his detonation efforts failed.  It is ap-
parent that highly reliable information that Abdulmutallab might be 
dangerous did not translate into security measures making him un-
suitable for boarding commercial airlines.  Described by prosecutors 
as “an unrepentant would-be mass murderer,” he was sentenced in 
February 2012, to life in prison. 67 
Like Muhammad, whose solid family in Memphis deplored his 
actions, Abdulmutallab had an eminently respectable family back-
ground.  He also had, for law enforcement purposes, a clean record.  
With both young men, families were deeply worried about their son’s 
accelerating radicalization, but the communication between responsi-
ble families and responsive authorities failed to make a timely connec-
tion. 
B. Prior Detection – Citizens’ Tips Lead to Arrests 
Citizen vigilance was the key to detecting the dangerous propen-
sities of Saudi college student Khalid Aldawsari in Lubbock, Texas.  
In February 2011, when he attempted to purchase phenol, a compo-
nent of explosives, Aldwasari was reported to the authorities by a 
North Carolina supply company.68  As authorities later learned, Al-
dawsari had already acquired three gallons of sulfuric acid and eight 
gallons of nitric acid, two key ingredients of bomb-making, both of 
which were purchased over the Internet.69  Once alerted, the FBI used 
secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act warrants to enter his 
apartment.  The resulting search disclosed highly incriminating evi-
dence ranging from a journal entry about carrying out attacks inside 
the United States to e-mails listing “nice targets” and instructions for 
converting a cell phone into a detonator.
70  According to the criminal 
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complaint filed against Aldawsari, his blog entries included his re-
quest to “grant me martyrdom for your sake and make Jihad easy for 
me only in your path . . . .”71 Aldawasari’s e-mail account served as 
repositories for his research on targets, explosives, and explosive 
components.72  
Not only was the evidence of Aldawsari’s deadly objectives 
overwhelming, but his capacity to inflict destruction was also clear.  
His assembly of components for explosives, along with his studies in 
chemical engineering, indicated an extremely dangerous scheme well 
on its way to perpetration until a member of the public alerted the 
authorities.  On June 27, 2012, a federal court convicted Adawsari for 
attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction.  Aldawsari will be 
sentenced on October 9, 2012 and faces life in prison.
73  
A citizen’s tip also prompted authorities in Waco, Texas to inves-
tigate United States Army Private First Class Naser Abdo, following 
his purchase of six pounds of gunpowder, shotgun ammunition, and a 
magazine for a semi-automatic weapon.74  A twenty-one year old sol-
dier, Abdo had earlier invoked Muslim beliefs to seek conscientious 
objector status.  His military status, however, was placed on hold fol-
lowing his arrest for child pornography,75 and in early July 2011, he 
went AWOL (Absent Without Official Leave).  Following the tip 
from the gun store clerk a few weeks later, agents arrested Abdo in a 
motel room a few miles from Ft. Hood.  Inside his room, agents found 
a hand gun, gun powder, shrapnel, pressure cookers, and an article 
apparently published by al-Qaeda, “Make a Bomb in the Kitchen of 
Your Mom.”
76  Abdo admitted that he intended to construct two 
bombs and explode them in a restaurant frequented by soldiers.  As 
he was led from court the day after his arrest, he shouted, “Nidal Ha-
san Fort Hood,” in apparent tribute to the alleged perpetrator of mass 
murder.77  As a result of a store clerk’s vigilance and the ensuing coun-
ter-terrorism effort, Abdo’s alleged scheme was stopped within days 
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of potential disaster.78  Thereafter, Abdo was convicted on July 12, 
2012 of six felonies, including planning to blow up a restaurant full of 
Fort Hood soldiers and planning to create a weapon of mass destruc-
tion.  He faces a life sentence.79  
C. Prior Detection - Targeting Suspects Through Undercover Oper-
ations 
As the fatal and near-fatal cases of lone wolf terrorism demon-
strate, solitary schemes provide fewer clues prior to perpetration.  To 
confront the daunting challenges of prior detection and the frightful 
consequences of failure, federal authorities pursue even modest evi-
dence of terrorist leanings with intensity in order to assure that no 
stone is left unturned.  To unearth any symptom of Islamic militancy, 
undercover agents make aggressive attempts to test a subject’s atti-
tudes and potential for destructive conduct.  At times, these pursuits 
include immersing the subject in unrelenting enticements that, as one 
observer suggested, “might be having the effect of turning armchair 
observers to active radicals.”80  As with any sting operation, imaginary 
schemes are created by investigators to bait the trap for the subject.81 
As a result, questions may arise as to whether a crime was prevented 
by law enforcement or effectively created by undercover informants.  
The publicly-disclosed facts do not show what made Rezwan 
Ferdaus a person of interest in the first place.  But when, outside his 
mosque in Worcester, Massachusetts, a cooperating witness began 
discussing firearms, Ferdaus approached the cooperator to inquire 
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about obtaining guns and bombs.82  According to the cooperator, 
“Ferdaus was interested in starting a movement.”83  As early as the 
first meeting with the cooperating witness, Ferdaus described his 
knowledge of GPS systems and electronics indicating that he had the 
skill to use explosive-filled drone airplanes to attack United States 
military facilities.  Ferdaus further indicated that he would need fund-
ing to support his violent schemes.84  Although there was no evidence 
of actual contact with any terrorist organization, his plans were de-
tailed.  Indeed, he “carefully researched and wanted to carry-out his 
plan to attack the Pentagon with remote controlled aircraft,” and he 
hoped to make contact with members of al-Qaeda or other potential 
terrorists.85  Multiple recordings with the cooperating witness included 
Ferdaus describing his goal of “blowing up federal buildings” and 
“killing persons inside.”86  
Following Ferdaus’ arrest, the United States Magistrate Judge, 
considering whether he should be released on bail, found the defend-
ant to be a “troubled young man” as well as very bright.87  Noting his 
college degree in physics and his considerable knowledge of electron-
ics, the court observed that he “reconfigured twelve cell phones as 
‘detonation’ devices and he prepared a video showing others how to 
make a mobile phone into a ‘detonator.’”88  As a result, the court had 
little difficulty in concluding that Ferdaus was a danger to community 
and that the evidence against him was strong even though the actual 
tools for them were provided to him by federal agents.  On July 20, 
2012, Ferdaus pleaded guilty to attempting to provide material sup-
port to terrorists and attempting to damage and destroy a federal 
building.  Sentencing is set for November 1, 2012, and, under the plea 
agreement, prosecutors will be asking for a 17-year jail sentence for 
Ferdaus.89  
Other cases further confirm that relentless enticement is standard 
operating procedure, so that a subject’s proclivities for terror are test-
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ed exhaustively.90  In the 2011 case of Amine El Khalifi, the under-
cover operation in Alexandria, Virginia was launched based on evi-
dence that the defendant espoused undertaking violent operations 
against the United States.91  Indeed, El Khalifi indicated from the out-
set of the investigation that he had a “plan to explode a bomb at an 
office building in the City of Alexandria containing offices occupied 
by the U.S. military.”92  As he continued to discuss his schemes with 
undercover operatives, El Khalifi offered details about placing a 
bomb in a restaurant that “was frequented by military officials,” as 
well as conducting a suicide operation in which he would blow himself 
up in the United States Capitol Building in Washington, D.C.93  In 
fact, he said he “would be happy killing thirty people.”94  With El 
Khalifi’s predisposition for lethal schemes well-established, the in-
formants provided him with supposed tools of the trade, including an 
inoperable MAC-X automatic weapon and a jacket supposedly con-
taining a bomb.95  The discussions also included the prospective pur-
chase of nails, glue, and cell phones to create homemade bombs.96  
Following extensive surveillance and recordings, federal agents waited 
until El Khalifi walked from his car toward the United States Capi-
tol.97  Then, they arrested him for crimes including an attempt to use a 
weapon of mass destruction against government property.98  Although 
El Khalifi’s case relied on undercover operatives to provide the ap-
parent means of destruction, those means were delivered into the 
hands of a suspect already committed to a terrorist agenda.  El Khalifi 
pleaded guilty to one count of attempted use of a weapon of mass de-
struction against United States property on June 22, 2012.99 
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Another lone wolf, Jose Pimental, also known as Mohammed 
Yusuf, had apparently studied information about bomb-making that 
was published online by al-Qaeda in its English language publication, 
Inspire.100  Fortunately, through a network of smaller police depart-
ments, the New York police learned of Pimental’s activities in May 
2009 and began to monitor him.101  An informant recorded incriminat-
ing statements while the surveillance of Pimental indicated that he 
purchased a clock, double piping, Christmas lights, and other compo-
nents of potential explosives.102  Ultimately, he was videotaped drilling 
holes into pipes, an event that prompted his arrest and prosecution 
under state terrorism charges.103  Although his plans were far from 
sophisticated or even well-developed, his rhetoric confirmed a dan-
gerous predisposition that warranted the extensive undercover efforts 
leading to his arrest.  
In September 2009, Michael C. Finton, age twenty-nine, was ar-
rested as he tried to detonate what he believed to be a bomb inside a 
van outside the federal courthouse in Springfield, Illinois.104  Finton, 
who also used the name Talib Islam, was an unmarried, part-time 
cook who had converted to Islam during the six years he had spent in 
state prison for convictions of aggravated battery and robbery.105  The 
abundant evidence of his al-Qaeda leanings ranged from his professed 
admiration of John Walker Lindh, the so-called “American Taliban,” 
to his expressions of interest in the Taliban attack that killed 166 in 
Mumbai, India.106  The investigation began in February 2009 after a 
confidential informant introduced Finton to undercover agents.  The 
false explosives were provided by undercover FBI agents posing as al-
Qaeda operatives following months of surveillance.  Charged with an 
attempt to murder a federal officer, as well as attempted use of a 
weapon of mass destruction against federal property, he pled guilty on 
May 9, 2009 and received a 28-year prison sentence.107 
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D. Prior Detection – Creating the Crime? 
In the case of James Cromitie,108 the United States district judge 
offered a remarkable description of the defendant’s claim that the 
undercover operation violated the due process clause of the United 
States Constitution.  
Defendant’s renewed motion, made and denied without preju-
dice prior to the trial, to have the indictment dismissed on the 
ground that the Government “created the criminal, and then 
manufactured the crime.” (cite omitted).  There is some truth to 
that description of what transpired here, nonetheless, the motion 
is denied.109  
The case began when Cromitie of Newburgh, New York said to a 
government witness that he wanted to go back to Afghanistan to ob-
tain a wife because of “the brothers killed in Pakistan and Afghani-
stan.”110  Later statements were even more troubling as Cromitie ex-
pressed a desire to go to “paradise”111 because he wanted to “do some-
thing to America.”112  Even so, for months Cromitie pushed back on 
the informant’s attempts to discuss the actual pursuit of terrorist 
schemes.113  Despite his initial militant rhetoric, Cromitie later retract-
ed his statement about going to Afghanistan and also indicated that 
he did not want to “go that far” with respect to any violent activities.114  
As Cromitie’s reluctance grew, the FBI made the striking observation 
that, “Cromitie was unlikely to commit an act without the support of 
the FBI source . . . .”115 Ultimately, Cromitie received all the support 
he needed when the FBI’s operative offered him $250,000 and pro-
posed a scheme to target Stewart Air Force Base in Connecticut with 
a bomb plot.  As the district judge observed:  
The Government selected targets . . . . The Government provid-
ed every item used in the plot: cameras, cell phones, cars, maps 
and even a gun. The Government did all the driving (as none of 
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the defendants had a car or driver’s license).  The Government 
funded the entire project.116  
Ultimately, the court found that even though Cromitie had for 
months resisted the undercover ploys, he nevertheless “put himself 
back into the Government’s sights” when he was prompted by the 
government informant’s $250,000 offer to pursue the Government 
created plot.117 In denying the motion to dismiss the indictment, the 
court observed that to establish the government’s “over involvement” 
in creating criminality, a due process violation only arises if the “out-
rageous Government misconduct” exceeds all notions of permissible 
conduct and shocks the conscience of the court.118  Tellingly, the court 
observed that the defense is “... an issue frequently raised that seldom 
succeeds.”119 
V. PREVENTATIVE DETENTION V. PREVENTATIVE PROSECUTIONS 
A review of reported lone wolf activity demonstrates that even 
though some tragic and near-tragic results have occurred, especially in 
firearm cases, law enforcement has demonstrated a highly effective 
and successful capacity to intervene well in advance of imminent peril. 
To be sure, the debate continues over whether more steps and earlier 
steps should be taken.  Few question the imperative for disabling ter-
rorist schemes long before they are inflicted on Americans.  Along the 
spectrum between hostile opinions and murderous deeds, earlier is 
manifestly better than later because the consequences of acting too 
late are so catastrophic.   
A. Crimeless Prisoners 
The urgency of preventative strategies has prompted an emerging 
focus on methodologies that do not require a provable crime.  In the 
wake of 9/11, the material witness statute was utilized to an unprece-
dented extent to authorize the temporary incarceration of individuals 
whose testimony was allegedly needed and whose presence must 
therefore be secured.120  Imprisoning these “witnesses” – many of 
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whom appeared to be persons of interest who were not provable as 
criminals – sparked criticism that the material witness law was being 
used pre-textually to justify otherwise unconstitutional preventative 
detentions.121  Since the law was conceived to hold only “material wit-
nesses” rather than unchargeable suspects, any such misuse of this 
statute would have troubling implications given our nation’s tradi-
tional aversion to arresting individuals when no crime is even al-
leged.122  In the case of Abdullah Al-Kidd, a Kansas native who played 
college football at the University of Idaho,123 the potential for abuse 
was vividly illustrated.  Stopped at Dulles Airport in March 2003, 
while en route to Saudi Arabia for doctoral studies, he was arrested as 
a “material witness,” confined naked in a cell for many hours, even 
though no one accused him of any crime.124  On June 27, 2012, a feder-
al magistrate judge ruled that Al-Kidd was falsely imprisoned and that 
the material witness law had been abused.125  Although subject to fur-
ther review by the United States district judge, this decision nonethe-
less represented the first ruling against the government on the merits 
in a post 9/11 material witness case.126  
As court decisions continue to delineate limits to the material 
witness law, a potentially more profound expansion of the govern-
ment’s capacity to detain preventatively was enacted on January 1, 
2012 when President Obama signed into law the National Defense 
Authorization Act of 2012 (“NDAA”).127  The controversial anti-
terrorism provisions of the NDAA appear to allow the United States 
military to detain individuals without charges or trial – including 
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United States citizens.128  Although the current administration has 
expressed its intention not to use such powers against citizens,129 and 
vigorous judicial challenges would await any such efforts, the enact-
ment of this legislation suggests an anxiety about the existing tools for 
preventing terrorism. 
B. Existing Federal Laws for Preventative Prosecutions 
That anxiety, however, seems unjustified.  While the concerns are 
understandable, the reality is that federal criminal prosecution in ter-
rorism cases has been remarkably effective.  An analysis of more than 
120 prosecutions dating back to the 1980’s – many of them focused on 
preventing and disabling terrorist activities – demonstrates a convic-
tion rate of 91.1%.130  Justice has not only been consistent, it has been 
forceful.  Along with eleven cases of life sentences, the remaining cas-
es resulted in an average of almost 101 months in federal prison.131  
With multi-actor terrorist schemes, the existing laws for prepara-
tory crimes are clearly adequate for preventative prosecutions of ter-
rorism.  Conspiracy laws do not require completed acts of violence 
but instead center on agreements with illegal objectives.132  While con-
spiracy can be charged as a separate crime apart from the substantive 
offense,133 by its nature, this crime requires proof that “the defendant 
agreed with at least one other person ‘to try to accomplish a common 
and unlawful plan . . . .’”134  Accordingly, even though conspiracy laws 
have been expanded significantly to combat terrorism,135 the essential 
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element of agreeing to act illegally with another would not be effica-
cious in the case of a true lone wolf. 
Along with conspiracy laws, another powerful tool in combating 
preparatory terrorism is law proscribing the giving of material assis-
tance to foreign terrorist organizations designated by the United 
States Secretary of State.136  Originally enacted in 1996, the “material 
support or assistance” laws criminalize giving assistance to organiza-
tions such as al-Qaeda, and since 1996, the laws have been legislative-
ly expanded to encompass providing a “service.”137  These “services” 
include “training” as well as “expert advice or assistance.”  Signifi-
cantly, illegal services also include furnishing “personnel,” a key ele-
ment because one’s own services can constitute providing “personnel” 
within the meaning of the law.138  
Based on the definitions for providing “material support or assis-
tance,” a federal appeals court found that an individual’s decision to 
offer one’s own services to al-Qaeda constitutes a crime of terrorism 
even if nothing further is attempted: 
[W]e nevertheless conclude that Augustia and Phanur’s volun-
teering of their services to Al Qaeda was sufficient for a jury to 
deem it material support in the form of personnel. Section 
2339A(g)(4) makes clear that providing personnel which means 
“(one) or more individuals who may be or include oneself,” con-
stitutes material support under § 2339B.139
Along with broad definitions for the scope of “material support 
or assistance,” these laws also explicitly encompass crimes of prepara-
tion: 
By its elements, § 2339A criminalizes material support given in 
preparation for the object offense – clearly, the object offense 
need not even have been completed yet, let alone proven as an 
element of the material support offense.140
Because laws of conspiracy and providing support to terrorist or-
ganizations necessarily implicate associational crimes, they are not 
ordinarily tailored for an early arrest of the true lone wolf.  As one 
court explained the traditional options for preparatory crimes, “. . .the 
three inchoate offenses are described as attempt, conspiracy, and so-
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licitation. . . .”141  Because neither conspiracy nor solicitation would, by 
definition, apply to a suspected terrorist acting exclusively on his own, 
lone wolf cases frequently relied on crimes of attempted terrorism.142 
Because attempted terrorism will likely remain the principal 
charge against solitary actors, it is apparent that the needs of early 
prevention will continue to rely on aggressive undercover tactics 
whenever possible suspects are identified.  As demonstrated in the 
case of James Cromitie,143 the government’s numerous efforts to in-
duce a suspect to attempt to commit terrorist crimes did not constitute 
either entrapment, according to the jury, or a due process violation, 
according to the district judge.144  Nor did the government’s heavy in-
volvement justify any reduction in Cromitie’s prison sentence.  During 
his sentencing, his attorney argued that federal agents deliberately 
created a scheme to increase Cromitie’s prison time by introducing a 
“missile element into the case.”145  The result was a twenty-five year 
minimum sentence.146  Even so, the court denied the defendant’s claim 
of “sentencing manipulation” as inapplicable to cases of legislatively 
enacted mandatory sentences.  In overruling the defense argument, 
the district judge acknowledged the high likelihood that the govern-
ment did indeed add circumstances to the imaginary scheme in order 
to impose added years upon the ultimate sentence.147 
As Cromitie illustrates, the government’s ability to target sus-
pects aggressively – offering them proposed details, supposed wea-
ponry, and actual cash – has seemingly few limits.  And yet, whatever 
may be the enticements, it takes a willing suspect to become an indict-
able defendant.  In rejecting another defense claim that the govern-
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ment’s over-involvement violated the due process clause, the federal 
appeals court said: 
The evidence in this case does not show that the government ran 
“the entire operation with only meager assistance from the [ap-
pellants].” Rather, the government only provided means to those 
who were “willing and predisposed.”148 
Thus, sting operations in terrorism cases may be controversial at 
times, but they are a well-accepted law enforcement tactic.  Further, 
they are essential to counter-terrorism investigations, especially in 
single actor scenarios.  By definition, the lone wolf suspect does not 
operate with accomplices whose loose lips might create leads for law 
enforcement.149   With the formidable challenge of detecting the activi-
ty of solo operators, anti-terrorism investigations are obliged to ex-
haustively explore any possible symptoms of peril.  Often, the tactics 
entail extreme activism by federal agents who may spend months test-
ing a suspect’s willingness to cross the line from talking trash about 
America to planning violence against Americans.  Since the proper 
focus is prior interception and prevention of terrorism, though, sting 
operations will remain a vital part of anti-terrorism strategies as surely 
as they will continue to be vigorously debated. 
C. Preventative Investigations: Data Mining and Monitoring 
While the statutory tools utilized for charging crimes of terrorism 
are apparent, less obvious are some of the investigative techniques 
that are being continually developed and enhanced.  Understandably, 
the government’s latest methodologies for data mining and electronic 
surveillance are generally not made public.  In some contexts, though, 
the mechanisms for early detection encompass private-public cooper-
ation and are publicly documented.  
One such system is set forth in Title 21, Section 830 of the United 
States Code: Regulation of Listed Chemicals and Certain Machines. 
This portion of the Controlled Substances Act provides for the Suspi-
cious Orders Task Force (SOTF) which requires that:  
Each regulated person shall report to the Attorney General. . . 
any regulated transaction involving an extraordinary quantity of 
a listed chemical, an uncommon method of payment or delivery, 
or any other circumstance that the regulated person believes may 
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indicate that the listed chemical will be used in violation of [the 
law].150 
The act further sets forth guidelines which “assist chemical manufac-
turers, distributors, wholesalers and retailers to be alert to suspicious 
orders involving listed chemicals” by delineating what constitutes a 
suspicious amount, payment method, or delivery location.151   While 
the SOTF generally deals with drug-related cases, it applies to haz-
ardous chemicals as well.  
In furtherance of such objectives, a “see something say some-
thing” campaign was adopted by the Department of Homeland Secu-
rity (“DHS”) to encourage members of the public to report suspicious 
activity.152 Additionally, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) 
established a Public Access Center Unit (“PACU”), which receives 
and assesses tips on potential threats.153  In 2003, the FBI launched 
“Operation Tripwire” to enlist specific industries to be on the lookout 
for terrorist planning or training activities.154  Since its inception, Op-
eration Tripwire has targeted thirty different industries, including air-
lines, prisons, and chemical companies, encouraging them to cooper-
ate with FBI agents concerning what may constitute suspicious activi-
ty.155  When and if anything suspicious or unusual is encountered, 
businesses are encouraged to contact FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task 
Force.156 
While specific results of Operation Tripwire may not be disclosed 
for security reasons, at least one major success became public.  When 
Khalid Alaawasri attempted to purchase hazardous chemicals for 
bomb-making from Carolina Biological Supply, he was detected, then 
reported.157 Because Carolina Biological Supply, a Tripwire partici-
pant, apparently had procedures in place to monitor orders involving 
the chemicals in question and report any suspicions, it alerted the FBI, 
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leading to the investigation and ultimately the arrest and conviction of 
Alaawasri.158 
Another important monitoring device was strengthened in 2001 
when Congress passed Title III of the USA PATRIOT Act: “the In-
ternational Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorism Fi-
nancing Act of 2001,” to attack terrorist financing by raising barriers 
to terrorist access to the United States financial system.  Among other 
requirements, these sections impose on bank and other United States 
financial institutions additional due diligence and record-keeping re-
quirements that are conceived to ascertain possible funding sources 
for terrorism.  These requirements have apparently contributed to 
asset seizures, sanctions, and increased surveillance that has evidently 
dealt serious blows to al-Qaeda’s financing.  Indeed, the United States 
Treasury reports that it has frozen $139 million in assets after 9/11 
pursuant to these laws.159   
Systems for detecting hazardous chemicals and suspicious money 
can have a meaningful impact in combating terrorism that utilizes ex-
plosives or well-financed organizations and operations.  But a solo 
killer who uses firearms rather than bombs apparently remains the 
least preventable form of terrorism.  Major Nidal Hassan and Abdul 
Haqim Mujahid allegedly succeeded with guns.  Would-be bombers, 
on the other hand, have been repeatedly intercepted since 9/11 before 
killing, even if fortuitously at times. 
On August 5, 2012, another single gunman attacked, this time, in 
the Sikh Temple of Wisconsin.160  Wade Michael Page killed six and 
wounded three before police bullets and self-inflicted wounds com-
bined to kill him.161  Linked to white supremacy groups, Page was the 
leader of a so-called hard-rock band, End Apathy,162and authorities 
treated the shooting as an act of domestic terrorism.163  Like other 
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lone wolf shooters discussed in this article, Page legally acquired his 
9mm semi-automatic handgun with multiple ammunition magazines.164 
His background, while troubling, did not place him on the radar of 
law enforcement.  Some past acquaintances of Page said he spoke in 
the past of “racial holy war,”165 but neither family members nor others 
had reported any recent warning signs.166  Although the Southern 
Poverty Law Center reportedly had Page’s name on its lists of alleged 
white supremists, because he was “one of thousands,” that name was 
not furnished to law enforcement.167  Unfortunately, there may be 
more white supremacists than there are resources to effectively moni-
tor all of them.168 
Another horror, while not connected to a terrorist agenda, also 
tragically confirmed America's extreme vulnerability to a solo shoot-
er.  On July 20, 2012, in a movie theater in Aurora, Colorado, James 
Holmes allegedly murdered 12 and wounded 58.169  He had no prior 
criminal record.  According to news reports, though, Holmes created 
a one man arsenal stockpiling thousands of bullets and head-to-toe 
ballistic gear, including body armor purchased on eBay.170  One source 
indicated that Holmes picked up 160 pounds of ammunition from a 
FedEx stop.171  Apparently, no one noticed, and website operators 
who sell guns, ammunition, and combat gear are not required to con-
duct background checks or engage in detailed record keeping.172  
While gun control advocates may demand background checks of 
potential purchasers, there is no compelling evidence that background 
checks would have prevented the violent tragedies at the Wisconsin 
Sikh temple or in the movie theater in Aurora, Colorado.173  The 9mm 
handgun used by Page and the four guns allegedly used by Holmes 
were all purchased legally.  In fact, Holmes passed the background 
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checks required in person and from online retailers.174  But arguably 
more can be done.  Almost assuredly, law enforcement will study the 
Sikh temple murders to examine whether more surveillance resources 
should be allocated to white supremacist hate groups.175  Moreover, 
while the Constitution affords protection to gun ownership,176 there is 
no current doctrine limiting the government’s capacity to undertake 
data mining of suspicious activity directed towards stockpiling weap-
ons and ammunition.  The SOTF provides a framework for a report-
ing system by businesses that could be applied to guns, ammunition, 
and ballistic gear.  The guidelines for identifying suspicious purchases 
of certain chemicals, criteria that speak to an “extraordinary quantity” 
or “uncommon method of payment or delivery,” may offer a frame-
work for detecting and reporting hazardous firearms and munitions, 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Plainly, aggressive tactics for investigating and prosecuting lone 
wolf terrorism are needed to address a grave danger that is accelerat-
ing.  Overwhelmingly, law enforcement has demonstrated the effec-
tiveness of existing legal tools for prosecuting terrorists, ranging from 
sting operations to today’s substantive anti-terrorism laws.  And yet 
because the stakes are so high, the public and its leaders understanda-
bly seek to pursue ways to do more to prevent terrorism.  
Illustrating this pursuit is the ongoing controversy over preventa-
tive detention, highlighted by the enactment of the National Defense 
Authorization Act of 2011.  Such a debate, however, should not fail to 
analyze the critical question of whether there are demonstrable short-
falls in the existing criminal laws.  As with organized schemes, the 
results in combatting the growing menace of the lone wolf dispel any 
need for crimeless military detention of suspects in order to prevent 
destruction.  To the contrary, the results of investigation and prosecu-
tion have repeatedly demonstrated that when relevant information is 
obtained and properly analyzed, the existing undercover strategies 
and present laws are highly effective.  The few cases where warning 
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signals were not acted upon were failures to properly diagnose danger 
rather than a legal incapacity to act forcefully.  Indeed, there are no 
reported cases of suspects who were investigated – and deemed can-
didates for detention – but then released to pursue a destructive 
agenda due to the inadequacy of existing laws. 
Rather than new laws for arrest and detention that could collide 
with constitutional safeguards, the primary challenge should be secur-
ing more information of potentially troubling activities, so that exist-
ing preventative strategies can be activated.  While surveillance and 
monitoring resources are properly focused on foreign terrorists organ-
izing activities, the capacity to better assess white supremacist and 
other domestic hate groups can be further examined.  Moreover, laws 
that foster monitoring abnormal transactions involving chemicals and 
funds are accepted tools in combatting terrorism.  Whether a political 
will exists for extending measures to guns and munitions, though, is 
beyond the scope of this article.177  Nor could the effectiveness of such 
measures be assessed without further study.  Tragically, not all terror-
ism is preventable.  When terrorism erupts, especially by a single kill-
er using guns, sometimes a ticking time bomb can be too far below the 
radar for anyone to see. 
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